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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ST.\TE OF (:-'l'..:\11,

Plaintif f-Rcspo11dc11t.
-vs-

Case :Xo.

TllO'.\L\S B. '.\IAllSEX,

Def c11daut-A p pcllaut.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
ST.\TE:\lE:XT OF

OF THE CASE

Thomas H.
appeals from judgment arnl
l'om·ictio11 enterecl against him in a jury trial before
the l>i-;trid Court of the Fourth .Judicial District, in
1111d for l 'tah County, State of ( 'tah, the Honorable
.\ llt'll B. Sorensen, Judge, presiding.

l>ISPOSITIO:X IX LO\\TER COCRT
.\ ppcllant was found guilty of selling a stimulant
drug
nrdict, and was sentenced according to
la" to imprisonment in the Ctah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The judgment of the verdict of guilty rendered in
the district court should be affirmed.
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees generally with the facts as expressed by appellant in his brief, with the following
additions and clarifications.
The record is silent as to the character of the marks
which may have originally appeared on the glassine
baggy delivered to Officer Farr. There was no indication that any such marks were indelible and were not
of a type likely to be inadvertently rubbed off through
normal handling of the baggy (Tr. 66).
The expert witness for the State, Dr. Swensen.
testified that he did not recall whether the bottle delivered to him by Officer Farr was sealed or unsealed
at the time he received it from the officer (Tr. 109,
llO).

ARGU1\1ENT
POINT I
THE E VI DENT I A RY CHAIN OF
CUSTODY 'VAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED TO ALLOW THE TESTIMONY o:F
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THE :EXPERT ' VITNESS TO BE ADMITTED
AS A 1\IATTER OF LA,V.
1

Officer Farr received a glassine baggy containing
a suspected drug from l\Ir. Carr the evening of March
2, 1971 ( T. 65). The baggy was then taken directly
to the Brigham Young F niversity Security Office by
Officer Farr where it was put into a plastic pill bottle,
sealed and tagged, and put into an evidence-holding
locker (T. 66). On l\Iarch 3, 1971, Officer West transferred the tagged evidence to the main evidence locker
(T. 103). It remained in that locker until .March 9,
1971, when Officer Farr transferred it to Dr. Swensen
( T. G8). Upon receiving it, Dr. Swensen locked it in
his safe (T. 109) and it remained there until Dr. Swensen removed it on ·l\farch 15, 1971, for the purpose of
making a chemical analysis ( T. 109).
The testimony established the whereabouts, control and custody of the evidence at all times from its
initial receipt on l\Iarch 2, 1971, through the time it was
tested by Dr. Swensen on
15, 1971. Each person ·who handled the evidence, and its successive repositories, had been fully accounted for.
Appellant cites several cases in which evidence has
been held inadmissible because a chain of possession had
not been snffieiently established. In Utah Farm Burcan
v.
6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957), the
testimony of a laboratory technician who had analyzed
a blood sample was excluded because the chain of custody
from Chugg to the technician could not be established.
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There was no evidence as to how, when or from 'vhom
she obtained the sample she tested, nor was there any
evidence or information from which she concluded that
the specimen she tested belonged to Chugg. No one could
remember who had drawn the blood, nor to whom the
blood specimen was given after it \vas drawn. In Cla1;ton v. IJfetropolitan Life In.yw·ance Company, 96 Utah
3ll, 8.5 P.2d 819 (1938) this Court upheld the exclusion
of a histological report on the plaintiff's appendix because the nurse who allegedly delivered the appendix
from the surgeon to the pathologist was not called as a
witness, and therefore continuous custody had not been
established.
In Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914 (9th Cir.
1960), objection was made to the admission of a sack
of marijuana, the custody of which was fully accounted for, but which had been kept in a safe accessible to
two persons, only one of whom testified at the trial.
The appellant sought to have the evidence excluded
because of the opportunity that an acting deputy collector of customs had to tamper with the evidence had
he so desired, and that the question of possible tampering- should not haYe been concluded without his testimony. In dismissing this theory, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals stated:
"The trial judge's determination that the
showing as to identification and nature of
contents is sufficient to warrant reception of
an article in evidence may not be overturned
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rxcept for a clear abuse of discretion ... No
abuse of discretion was shown here. Before a
physical object connected with the commission
of a crime may properly be admitted in evidence, there must be a showing that such
object is in substantially the same condition as
when the crime was committed. This determination is to be made by the trial judge. Factors
to be considered in making this determination
include the nature of the article, the circumstances surrounding the preservation and
custody of it, and the likelihood of intermed<llers tampering with it. If upon the consideration of such factors the trial judge is satisfied
that in reasonable probability the article has
not been changed in important respects, he
may permit its introduction in evidence. Where
no evidence indicating otherwise is produced,
the presumption of regularity supports the official acts of public officers, and courts presume that they have properly discharged their
official duties."
In the case at bar, physical custody of the evidence
was at all times accounted for by testimony from those
who had handled it. 'l'he chain of custody was fully
established, and appellant's only basis for attacking it
is Dr. Swensen's testimony that he could not remember
whether the bottle was sealed at the time he received it
from Officer Farr ('f. 110). From this, appellant
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draws the impermissible conclusion thal the bottle was
therefore unsealed, and further that its contents must
necessarily have been surreptitiously adulterated by
either the police or Dr. Swensen prior to the chemical
analysis performed on .March 15, 1971.

!11,

Even if it were conceivable that the evidence in
question had been tampered with, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by admitting the exhibit into
evidence. In [Tn:ted States v. Stevenson, 445 F.2d 25
(7th Cir. 1971) the court considered an allegation identical to that raised by appellant in the instant case. Stevenson was prosecuted and convicted for narcotics offenses, and had urged that the evidence was not sufficient because of a possibility of a break in the chain
of custody of the narcotics introduced in evidence
against him. In its opinion, the court said:
"Stevenson concedes that on this question
the trial judge is to determine the adequacy of
the evidence of custody to warrant reception of
physical evidence and that this decision can be
overturned only for clear abuse of discretion.
Ile also concedes that government witnesses
testified to the whereabouts of the evidence
during the entire period from its acquisition
until trial. Ile contends, however, that due to
the length of time between the alleged offense
and his second trial, the number of people who
had custody of the evidence, the fact that at
one point the evidence was mailed to and from
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\Vashington, D.C., and the fact that government witnesses refreshed their recollection
from official records, it is 'a bit more than conceivable that tampering with the evidence has
occurred.' Such utter speculation cannot be
credited on appeal in the face of government
evidence showing a continuous chain of custody. As Stevenson further concedes, the mere
fact that it is conceivable that tampering has
occurred is not sufficient to require the exclusion of the evidence."
Appellant's summary of alleged changes, set forth
at page 10 of Appellant's Brief, is based upon conclusions which cannot fairly be inferred from Dr. Swensen's inability to recall whether the pill bottle had been
sealed when he received it.
In the instant case, the chain of custody having
been fully established, the trial judge properly admitted
the exhibit and testimony into evidence, and allowed
what question, if any, regarding its identity, to go to the
weight to be given it by the jury. Eisentrager v. State,
79 Nev. 38, 378 P.2d 526 (1963); State v. McFarland,
401 P .2d 824 (Supreme Court of Idaho, 1965) ; People
v. Levene_. 107 C.A.2d 125, 236 P.2d 604 (1951).
POINT II
TIIE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY
DENYING APPELLANT'S :MOTION TO DIS-
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MISS BECAUSE THE STATE SUFFICIENTLY PROVED THAT APPELLANT HAD
SOLD A PROSCRIBED DRUG.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6 ( 1953) states that it
shall be unlawful for any person to ... sell ... any ...
stimulant ... drug as defined therein. Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-33-1 ( d) ( 1953) defines "stimulant drug" as:
"
( 2) Any drug which contains any
quality of (A) amphetamine: dl-methamphetamine; or any of their optical isomers; ...
or ( C) any substance designated by regulations promulgated under the federal act as
habit-forming because of its stimulant effect
on the central nervous system."
Appellant contends that this provision proscribes
only dl-methamphetamine and asserts that the State was
obligated to prove that the substance in question was dlmethamphetamine to the exclusion of anything else.
Not only does the statute specifically proscribe dl-methamphetamine, but Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-1 ( d) (2)
( C) proscribes any substance designated by regulations
promulgated under the federal act as habit-forming.
Those federal regulations define as habit-forming stimulant drugs. d and dl-metamphetamine. 21 C.F.R. §
320.3(b) (Supp. 1971). Therefore, if the substance
in question were either d or dl, it would specifically he
proscribed under the Utah provision.
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Dr. Swensen testified that d-methamphetamine and
1-methamphetamine are optical isomers of each other
(T. 123). Ile also testified that all methamphetamine
is either d or 1 and that dl is a mixture of both (T. 122).
The issue is whether 1-methamphetamine is proscribed
because if it is, then a chemical analysis which merely
determines whether a substance is amphetamine or methamphetamine, as in this case, is sufficient proof that a
substance thus identified is a proscribed drug under
the statute.
Dr. Swensen testified that the d and 1 configurations have identical chemical properties, except for optical rotation, ( T. 122) and that the physiological effects are identical (T. 123). The statute refers to amphetamine dl-methamphetamine, or any of their optical
isomers. Since dl-methamphetamine is merely a mixture
of the two configurations, each retaining its distinct
property of optical rotation, the optical isomers of dlmethamphetamine are those of the separate component
compounds d and I. As Dr. Swensen testified, each of
those is the optical isomer of the other; therefore, the I
configuration is one of the optical isomers of the dlmixture and comes within the proscription of the statute. Ily determining that the substance was amphetamine or methamphetamine. Dr. Swensen had tested sufficiently to prove that it was a proscribed drug under
the statute, because the statute, by including optical isomers, applies to all forms of methamphetamine.
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POINT III
APPELLANT'S CASE 'VAS NOT PREJUDICED BY INSTRUCTION NU.l\IUER 5,
OR ANY OTHER INSTRUCTION TO THE
JURY.
The information charged appellant with the sale
of a stimulant drug in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-33-6. The word "sale" as used in that provision is
defined in Section 58-33-1 (h) which states that "sale"
or "sell" includes barter, exchange, transfer, give, convey, deliver, etc. An information need only charge essential elements of a statutory offense, and when this
is done the accused is fairly appraised of what he is
called upon to meet at the trial. People v. Holt, 209 P.2d
94, 93 C.A.2d 473 ( 1949) ; State r JF alsh, 463 P.2d 41,
1•

81 N.:M. 65 ( 1969).

In the instant case, Instruction No. 5 ( R. 31)
stated:
"Under the laws of this state, any person
who intentionally sells, furnishes or gives away
any stimulant drug is guilty of a felony. Any
drug or derivative which contains any quantity
of dl-methamphetamine is a stimulant drug."
The Instruction as vrnrded conformed to the pleadings
and the testimony received at the trial, and accordingly was a proper and satisfactory instruction. State v.
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A
127 P .2d 872, 102 Utah 113 ( 1942) ; State v.
Bray, 472 P.2d 54, 106 Ariz. 185 (1970); Barfield v.
State, 110 P.2d 316, 71 Okl.Cr. 195 ( 1941).

In the case at bar, Mr. Carr testified ( T. 24, 25) :
QUESTION:

\Vhat happened then?

ANS\VER: As I handed the money over,
.Mr. :Madsen stood up, went outside for about
a minute or so, and then came back in.
QUESTION:
time?
ANSWER:
QUESTION:

Who was in the booth at that
The same four.
What happened then?

ANS\VER: l\lr. Madsen put his hands down
in a cupping fashion onto the table itself,
lifted his hand up, and there was a small bag
that he said was crank.
Instruction No. 5 confarmed to the statutory definition of "sale"; it had a sufficient basis in the testimony received and was therefore not prejudicial. Appellant cites State v. Pacheco, ____ Utah 2d.... , (Supreme
Court No. l 2589) as authority for his assignment of
error, but the Pacheco case is inapposite to the case at
bar. Pacheco involved an instruction relating to a separate crime with which Pacheco had not been charged.
Here, the instruction related solely to the crime with
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which the appellant was charged, and the court committed no error by giving the instruction. Appellant asserts
that instructions referring to sale of a "stimulant drug"
effected a broadening of the charge; however, the
charge as expressed in the information (R. 12) was sale
of a stimulant drug. Instruction No. 7 informed the
jurors that each instruction should be construed in light
of and in harmony with all the other instructions. Instruction No. 5 contained a sufficient definition of
"stimulant drug" to allow a finding that the substance
in question was a proscribed stimulant drug, and in fact
was supported by testimony received from Dr. Swensen
to the effect that the substance he tested was dl-methamphetamine (T. 123).
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION BY ALLO\VING THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY TO REOPEN PRIOR TO
PRESENTATION OF APPELLANT'S DEFENSE.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-1 ( 1953) allows the court
discretion to permit either party to offer evidence upon
its original case, even after the offering party has rested, if the court feels there is "good reason in furtherance of justice." In the case at bar, appellant had not
proceeded with his defense, and the court appropriately
desired that a more positive connection be demonstrated
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between the substance tested and the applicable statute.
As was stated in State v. Duncan, 102 Utah 449, 132
P.2d 131 ( 1942) "the purpose of a trial is to obtain the
facts ... the court and counsel for both sides should
aid in the presentation of ... testimony to prevent a
miscarriage of justice."
Contrary to appellant's assertion, the district attorney did not change his theory of the case. The information charged the sale of a proscribed stimulant
drug. The testimony produced after the reopening
showed that any form of methamphetamine was proscribed by the statute, and did not constitute a change
of theory prejudicial to the appellant.

CONCLUSION
The court below committed no error and the judgment and conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROl\lINEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
DAVID R. IRVINE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

